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I. INTRODUCTION
While the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act") focused
largely on updating common carrier policy, several provisions modified
broadcast-especially radio--licensing and ownership. Any change in
media ownership policy soon generates hot debate in this era of ever-tighter
consolidation across the economy, and these statutory changes and the
proceedings they prompted were no exception.
Critics have long lamented that media are controlled by too few big
owners. 2 Persuaded that ownership diversity was vital to the public interest,
*Professor of Media and Public Affairs and of Public Policy and Public Administration,
George Washington University. Served as Special Assistant to Commissioner Anne P. Jones
from 1980-82. Ph.D., M.S., B.S., University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). The law's provisions formed a series of amendments to
various parts of the baseline Communications Act of 1934.
2. While now more than three decades old, the best survey of research on this issue
remains WALTER S. BAER ET AL., CONCENTRATION OF MASS MEDIA OWNERSHIP: ASSESSING
THE STATE OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE (1974).
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for decades the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") limited
radio and television station ownership at both the local market and national
levels. Various FCC policies sought to increase content diversity, economic
competition, and ethnic minority entry and participation. 3 Such policies
followed the presumption that ownership of print or electronic media
outlets affected their content and that diverse editorial points of view are
important in a democracy.4 At the same time, control of advertising outlets
(such as radio stations) has been one important factor in determining
healthy competition at both market and national levels.
5
Taking these and other presumptions into account, broadcast
ownership policy has traditionally questioned how many outlets (individual
media, such as a radio station) may be controlled by any one ownership
voice.6 While the online world is changing the concept of a local
marketplace, issues of ownership have typically focused more on market
rather than national levels, as audiences select among those media outlets
available to them. A New Yorker has little interest in what media are
available to audiences in San Diego.
Many factors contribute to the decision to acquire one or more media
outlets, the potential for making a profit chief among them. If ownership of
several media outlets in one market offers the option of greater return
through increased efficiency, such as automation or shared resources, so
much the better. In some cases, ownership of multiple media has been
pursued to expand economic or political power-Hearst or Murdoch come
to mind. Availability of investment capital and low interest rates are also
important facilitators. Changing technology has often encouraged
3. For a historical review, see Christopher H. Sterling, Television and Radio
Broadcasting, in WHO OWNS THE MEDIA? CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHW IN THE MASS
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 299 (Benjamin M. Compaine & Douglas Gomery eds., 2d ed.
1979).
4. Whether ownership diversity prompts increased variety of content is another matter.
However, with several research papers suggesting that while consolidation may limit market
entry, it may also (if ironically) help to increase program variety as the monopoly owner
seeks the widest possible audience reach. E.g., Peter Steiner, Program Patterns and
Preferences, and the Workability of Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q. J. OF ECON.
194 (1952); Steven J. Berry and Joel Waldfogel, Do Mergers Increase Program Variety?
Evidence from Radio Broadcasting, 116 Q. J. OF ECON. 1009, 1010 (2001) (concluding
that consolidation "reduces station entry [but] ... increases product [program] variety.").
5. For an in-depth assessment of the issues and status across a variety of media, see
BENJAMIN M. COMPAINE & DOUGLAS GOMERY, WHO OWNS THE MEDIA? COMPETITION AND
CONCENTRATION IN THE MASS MEDIA INDUSTRY (3d ed. 2000). For the radio and the music
business specifically, see id. at 285-358.
6. For one longitudinal use of the voice-and-outlet idea, see Christopher H. Sterling,
Trends in Daily Newspaper and Broadcast Ownership, 1922-70, 52 JOURNALISM Q. 247
(1975).
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consolidation. And obviously, policy changes can affect ownership, as the
1996 Act's provisions have demonstrated over the past decade.
II. LICENSE RENEWALS
While the 1996 Act increased radio station license terms from seven
to eight years, the more important policy change affected license renewals.
For decades, broadcasters had pressed both the FCC and Congress to
establish some de ree of "renewal expectancy" if a licensee provided
acceptable service. While few licenses were ever challenged in so-called
comparative renewals, and fewer still denied, the issue remained hotly
controversial and kept legions of attorneys busy at a high cost to
broadcasters even if licenses were nearly always renewed. One notable case
involved fourteen licenses worth over one billion dollars, several of which
were eventually reassigned. 8 While process seemed at times to overtake
substance in these proceedings, the FCC had little choice given the
statutory requirements in the 1934 Communications Act ("1934 Act").9
With a sweep of its legislative hand, Congress removed all this with a
new subsection (k) added to Section 309 of the 1934 Act. It requires that a
license be renewed if the licensee fulfills three requirements: (A) the station
has served the public interest, convenience or necessity; (B) the licensee
has not been found guilty of "serious violations" of the Act or FCC rules;
and (C) the licensee has committed "no other violations" of the Act or FCC
rules, "which, taken together, would constitute a pattern of abuse."' 0 These
generalized standards-none of which speak directly to the quality of the
program service provided-are very easy to meet for the vast majority of
stations. Only if a licensee is found not to meet these standards, and then
only if "no mitigating factors justify the imposition of lesser sanctions,"
can the FCC deny a license." And only after such a denial may the FCC
even begin to consider a different licensee. Put simply, the "comparative"
7. For a history of the comparative renewal process, see Formulation of Policies and
Rules Relating to Broadcast Renewal Applicants, Competing Applicants, and Other
Participants to the Comparative Renewal Process and to the Prevention of the Abuses to the
Renewal Process, Second Further Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rule Making in
BC, 3 F.C.C.R. 5179, 5186-88 (1988).
8. Christopher H. Sterling, Billions in Licenses, Millions in Fees: Comparative
Renewals and the RKO Mess, 2 GANNET CTR. J. 43 (1988).
9. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (2000) (requiring comparative hearings if more than one
applicant for a broadcasting station sought the same facilities).
10. Id. § 309(k)(l)(A)-(C). The phrase "public, convenience or necessity" dates to the
1927 Radio Act and is repeated verbatim as the standard of regulatory discretion at several
points in the 1934 Act as well. It has never been defined by statute, but rather by the steady
accretion of court cases that have generally, but not always, held that the phrase means
whatever the current FCC defines it to mean.
11. Id. § 309(k)(3).
NUMBER 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS L4 W JOURNAL
aspect of renewals was eliminated. Renewals became all but automatic,
making the eight-year term more a matter of minor administrative review
than any real threat of a loss of license for outlets that broadcast for
decades.
12
This change is interesting on two counts. Most importantly, it
removes any regulatory discretion from the FCC-the rule is written such
that licenses will be renewed save for egregious violations. The burden of
proof to deny appears to be on the FCC as competitor consideration is
prohibited. It does not get much clearer than that. And to underline its
intent, Congress made this provision retroactive to renewals after May 1,
1995, eight months before the 1996 Act was passed-just about the only
retroactive enactment in the 1996 amendments.
As best as can be determined, there have been no licenses vacated or
not renewed under these 1996 provisions-other than a relative handful of
licensees (nearly all AM) that have voluntarily surrendered their permits to
operate. Or turning the statement around, the 1996 provisions clearly
worked just as broadcasters hoped they would. Lacking comparative
renewals--or fear of such-active membership in the broadcast bar has
declined accordingly. An issue that for years took up reams of paper and
hours of legal billing has virtually disappeared.
IH. LOCAL OWNERSHIP
Of presumably lasting impact are the 1996 Act's provisions
concerning how many stations one owner can control in a single market.
Until 1992 FCC adhered to its duopoly 13 policy forbidding a licensee to
own more than one station of any type-AM, FM, TV-in a given market.
With the 1996 amendments, Congress (acknowledging the huge post-1945
growth in the number of radio outlets from about 900 to some 12,000)
concluded that such a one-to-a-customer rule was no longer necessary in
radio. Instead, using a graduated scale based on market size, defined by
how many outlets were licensed, legislators allowed ownership of up to
eight AM or FM stations as outlined in the following table: 14
12. See Mark D. Schneider, Renewal Procedures and Expectancy Before and After the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, COMM. LAW., Summer 1996, at 9, 9-10; Lili Levi, Not
With a Bang But a Whimper: Broadcast License Renewal and the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, 29 CoNN. L. REv. 243, 244-48 (1996).
13. Defined as a situation in which two companies own all or nearly all of a radio
market, the term came to mean ownership of no more than one AM and FM (and, though
much later, one OR the other) station in the same local market. "Local" in this sense means
communities where stations substantially overlap their signal coverage.
14. Telecommunications Act, § 202(b)(1) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555).
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TABLE 1
NUMBER OF RADIO OUTLETS THAT ONE OWNER CAN HAVE PER MARKET
...............................................................
INA MARKET WITH: A SINGLE LICENSEE CAN CONTROL UP
TO THIS MANY COMMERCIAL RADIO
STATIONS:
-------------------------------------------------------------..
45 OR MORE RADIO OUTLETS UP TO 8, NO MORE THAN 5 IN THE
SAME SERVICE (AM OR FM)
30-44 OUTLETS UP TO 7, NO MORE THAN 4 IN THE
SAME SERVICE
15-29 OUTLETS UP TO 6, NO MORE THAN 4 IN THE
SAME SERVICE
14 OR FEWER OUTLETS UP TO 5, NO MORE THAN 3 IN THE
SAME SERVICE
Under examination, however, these seemingly firm limits are actually
flexible. The 1996 Act allows for a licensee to own more than the number
of stations shown if an applicant can demonstrate that to do so "will result
in an increase in the number of radio broadcast stations in operation."'
15
Presuming no added interference, this would not seem a difficult standard
to achieve where frequencies remain vacant. On the other hand, the law
says no single owner can control more than half the stations in any market.
The market ownership caps refer, of course, only to numbers of stations-
they say nothing about the audience popularity or economic power of those
stations. One outlet is seen as the equivalent of another. Yet clearly a
multiple outlet cluster located in a major market will rapidly become a
jewel in the crown of any multiple station owner.
The 1996 Act also called for continuing reassessment of all ownership
policy. Section 202(h) requires the FCC to review all of its broadcasting
ownership rules every two years. 16 This has led to a series of FCC studies
and proceedings and more than a few court reviews and reversals. Regular
reports on the state of radio broadcast ownership appeared through 2001.I7
15. Id. § 202(b)(2).
16. This was later changed to four years when it became clear the FCC was falling
behind.
17. See FCC, Review of the Radio Industry, http://www.fcc.gov/mb/policy/radio.html
(last visited Mar. 21, 2006).
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In a special 2002 staff research report, FCC data showed that since the
1996 Act, there had been a decline in the number of separate station owners
in most radio markets. New York saw a drop from thirty-three owners to
twenty-two in that five year period, while Los Angeles declined from
thirty-nine to twenty-eight, Chicago from fifty-nine to thirty-seven, and
Washington, D.C. dipped from thirty-one down to twenty-one. 18 While a
few markets remained little changed and a handful actually saw an increase
in competition, the predominant trend was clear-fewer owners operated
more stations. Indeed, though the overall number of radio outlets rose by
5.4% in the five years following the 1996 legislation, the number of station
voices (owners) declined by more than a third (34%).19
Armed with industry data and lobbying, as well as three-quarters of a
million public comments (virtually all of the latter against further loosening
of the rules), the FCC issued an extensive set of broadcast and cable
ownership policy changes in June 2003.20 Included was a rule changing
how radio markets would be defined for the purposes of attributing station
ownership. Rather than using station signal contours (maps showing
predicted coverage areas based on power, antenna location, etc.), the FCC
said it would apply geographic market definitions as established by
Arbitron, the radio ratings company. Under the Arbitron method, all
stations licensed to communities in a market and stations licensed
elsewhere but substantially listened to (or "home") in that market will
count toward the limits shown in the table-a more stringent definition
than had prevailed since 1996. The decision added that both commercial
and noncommercial outlets will be counted in determining the number of
stations in a market. This change was one of the few to be upheld when
most of the remaining FCC rules, including an FCC decision to retain the
existing radio ownership cars based on market size, were stayed and then
remanded in a court appeal. As is its normal practice in such rulemakings,
however, the FCC said it would not require divestiture of radio stations that
exceeded the new market definition until and unless they are sold or traded.
18. George Williams & Scott Roberts, Radio Industry Review 2002: Trends in
Ownership, Format, and Finance app. F (FCC, Media Bureau Staff Research Paper, Media
Ownership Working Group, Paper No. 11, 2002).
19. Id. at 3.
20. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13620 (July 2, 2003); Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-
Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast
Stations in Local Markets, and Definition of Radio Markets, 68 Fed. Reg. 46286 (Aug. 5,
2003) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
21. Most of the other rules were remanded for further consideration by the FCC in June
2004. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125
S.Ct. 2904 (2005).
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And several large owners did exceed the statutory limit of eight outlets-in
2003, for example, Clear Channel alone owned from eleven to fifteen
stations per market, under the old definition, in sixteen different
communities-and controlled nine stations in a dozen further cities and
towns.22 Some of these were smaller and overlapping markets that
"allowed"-again, under the old market definition-Clear Channel to
control well over half of the audience and advertising revenue, even though
such cases appeared to exceed limits set by Congress in 1996. Few of these
stations have been sold or traded in the years since.
The remand by the court, however, was an important aspect of the
FCC's radio reasoning. In its mid-2003 rules package, the FCC posited that
five more-or-less equal-sized station owners defined its ideal goal for a
competitive radio market. Yet the actual ownership situation across the
country does not approach that goal-most markets are dominated by one
or two owners of multiple stations who control the most popular outlets as
well. Assailed by both pro-deregulation spokespersons claiming that many
types of market structures can be competitive, as well as citizens' groups
who argued that the FCC's own data made clear few markets achieved such
a structure, the court remanded this part of the revised radio rules for
additional FCC consideration. The FCC was to determine whether five
competitors was the right goal, and if so why, and how to achieve that or
any modified goal.
23
IV. NATIONAL OWNERSHIP
Unlike the somewhat nuanced approach to local market ownership,
the 1996 amendments very clearly eliminated any national radio station
ownersbip cap. nto the eary 1980s. the FCC had allowed a single owner
no more than seven AM and seven FM stations, as well as seven television
stations, no more than five of which could be on VHF channels. Beginning
in 1981, successive FCC rules changes slowly increased the number of AM
and FM stations that could be owned to twelve of each, then eighteen, and
finally to twenty24 and twelve in television. Congress took the ultimate step
with its 1996 amendments, wiping out any radio limitation at all. Just a
month later, the FCC implemented these provisions to eliminate its national
radio multiple ownership rule. The full effects of this change soon became
22. John Dunbar & Aron Pilhofer, Big Radio Rules in Small Markets, THE CENTER FOR
PUBLIC INTEGRITY, Oct. 1, 2003, http://www.openairwaves.orgltelecomlprinter-friendly
.aspx?aid=63.
23. Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 421.
24. These limits could be exceeded to a total of twenty-three stations if owned by an
ethnic minority.
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apparent, unintended though they may have been.
25
Radio's changing ownership profile makes clear that eliminating the
national ownership cap has had substantial impact. Whereas CBS was the
largest radio owner in terms of revenue with thirty-nine stations and 6% of
overall radio revenue, a month after the new law was passed, by late 1998,
Infinity, with 158 stations and nearly 17% of revenue, had taken the lead.
Over the next four years, station transfers (sales) expanded greatly, and
prices for good properties shot up accordingly. Many long-time station
operators sold out to the growing radio groups. The number of owners of
radio stations dropped by a quarter (from 5,100 to about 3,800) between
1996 and 2001. 26 By March 2002-just five years after the amendments
were passed-the radio industry had consolidated to the structure it still
holds today. Clear Channel, with 1,156 stations across the country, took in
nearly 27% of total industry revenue. Adding Infinity, 184 stations and
nearly 18% of revenue, the top two group owners controlled more than
44% of total radio revenue in the country. By late 2005, radio's overall
picture had changed only marginally-the second largest owner was now
Cumulus with just over 300 stations, while Infinity dropped to fourth with
178-due in part to the telecommunications/information sector financial
meltdown that began in 2000 and dried up investment capital. But any
measure of ownership depends on what numbers are being applied. Looked
at in terms of audience in late 2005, for example, Clear Channel reached
nearly 107 million listeners a week-more than a third of the country's
population-while 58 million tuned in to runner-up Infinity. The largely
rural stations owned by Cumulus ranked only tenth with 8.5 million.
28
V. IMPACT AND OUTLOOK
While other factors contributed to radio's consolidation, the 1996
amendments were the primary cause. Indeed, that concentration is a
continuing though now more gradual trend. The declining number of radio
owners has redefined local radio markets where one owner often controls
half of the listening options, contributing to homogenized programming
25. Concerning the issue of intent, see Christopher H. Sterling, U.S. Communications
Industry Ownership and the 1996 Telecommunications Act: Watershed or Unintended
Consequences?, in MEDIA POWER, PROFESSIONALS, AND POLICIES 56 (Howard Tumber ed.,
2000).
26. COMMON CAUSE EDUCATION FUND, THE FALLOUT FROM THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ACT OF 1996: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED 10 (2005), available at
http://www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/%7BFB3C 17E2-CDDI-4DF6-92BE-BD4429893665
%7D/FALLOUTFROMTHETELECOMMACT_5-9-05.PDF [hereinafter COMMON
CAUSE EDUCATION FUND].
27. Williams & Roberts, supra note 17, at app. C.
28. Who Owns What, Oct. 5, 2005, at 1-2 (on file with the Author).
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that has created a "mall" of similar-sounding stations across the nation. The
largest single owner, Clear Channel, operates 10% of all the radio stations
and reaches a third of the nation's population, while the largest ten owners
together control two-thirds of radio listening and advertising revenues.
29
Pursuit of economies of scale have substantially reduced locally-produced
programming as well as employment. Given the narrowing radio music
menus and the proportion of time devoted to advertising-as well as the
decline of local news and public affairs programming (many stations
provide none)-it is no surprise radio is experiencing something of a crisis
of self-confidence.
Much of this was probably unintended when Congress passed the
1996 amendments package. Adhering to pleas from broadcast lobbyists for
regulatory relief of a business that was not making much money and was
not a primary news resource anyway, many congressmen presumed they
were merely clearing regulatory underbrush, as it was often stated, left over
from the days of a much smaller radio-television business. But the resulting
change was more far reaching than already indicated. Growth in station
ownership by ethnic minorities, for example, appears to have flattened if
not fallen off: one petitioner to the FCC cited a 14% drop in minority
ownership of radio outlets since 1996.3 1 This decline is blamed in part on
high station prices, which have tempted the few minority stations to sell out
while making it hard for others to enter the market.32 The popular music
business has its own concerns which focus on the tight control of radio
stations, concert venues, and even billboards by Clear Channel and a few
other major players. 33
Is there any way to repair the damage that critics argue has been done
to radio by the 1996 changes in the law? As Congress considers new
legislation, it might consider the case of radio and the impact of unintended
consequences. Two things seem worth a revisit--the virtual assurance of
license renewal-in which case, why have a license at all?-and the
dominance of but one or two consolidated radio station owners in most
markets. Negotiating a roll-back of the 1996 provisions, even a minor shift
in degree, would face fierce lobbying by the radio business, but the results
29. See Future of Music Coalition, Radio Deregulation: Has It Served Citizens and
Musicians? 3 (Nov. 18, 2002), http://www.futureofmusic.org/images/FMCradiostudy.pdf
[hereinafter Future of Music Coalition].
30. See COMMON CAUSE EDUCATION FUND, supra note 25, at 10.
31. Id. at 11.
32. The last official report is now six years old, though new data has been gathered. See
generally NTIA, MTDP Resource Center, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/opadhome/mtdpweb/
resources.htm#reports (collecting minority ownership statistics reports) (last visited Apr. 8,
2006).
33. See Future of Music Coalition, supra note 28, at 4-9.
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might actually be beneficial to a radio business facing serious competition
for audience ears. And they would certainly assist media diversity.
Radio seems to have lost its luster, especially for many younger
listeners. The decline in radio listening has been driven by expanding
technological options-MP3 players, particularly the ubiquitous iPods, and
growing satellite subscription services (e.g., XM and Sirius Satellite Radio,
which reached close to eight million subscribers as this was written). While
many in radio are rightly concerned about these external threats, some
argue radio must tend to its own house to attract and hold listeners. Though
the business is once again seeking to reinvent itself to better compete in its
developing multichannel digital marketplace with varied formats and by
reducing advertising time, the role of radio's post-1996 consolidation in
this transition is open to question. While multiple-owner deep pockets may
help cushion change, what is the cost in program variety and local service
to listeners? If radio's consolidation turns out to have been a mistake-as
many strongly feel to be the case-undoing it will be difficult at best. We
will live with the results for a long time.
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